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HACKING WITHOUT HUMANS
House Rules: Designing the Scoring 
Algorithm for Cyber Grand Challenge
Benjamin Price and Michael Zhivich | MIT Lincoln Laboratory
Michael Thompson and Chris Eagle | Naval Postgraduate School
The key driving force behind any capture-the-flag competition is the scoring algorithm; the Cyber 
Grand Challenge (CGC) was no different. In this article, we describe design considerations for the CGC 
events, how these algorithms intended to incentivize competitors, and effects these decisions had on the 
resulting gameplay.
S coring algorithms are at the core of any competi-tion. They define the objective of a game and drive 
competitors’ strategies, guiding investments of effort, 
affecting resulting gameplay, and last (but not least) 
determining who captures the glory and walks away 
with the prize. As such, much consideration is given to 
design of scoring algorithms by organizers of any com-
petition, and the Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC) was 
no different. CGC’s lofty vision was to “engender a new 
generation of autonomous cyber defense capabilities 
that combine the speed and scale of automation with 
reasoning abilities exceeding those of human experts.”1
In particular, CGC challenged competitors with a 
highly nontrivial task of “improv[ing] and combin[ing] 
semi-automated technologies into an unmanned Cyber 
Reasoning System (CRS) that can autonomously rea-
son about novel program flaws, prove the existence of 
flaws in networked applications, and formulate effective 
defenses.”1
In practice, this meant that a CRS would be pro-
vided a bespoke, known vulnerable, challenge binary
that implemented functionality for a never-before-seen 
network application or service. The CRS would then 
have to produce a replacement binary that mitigated the 
effects of the embedded vulnerability and a proof of vul-
nerability describing an interaction with the vulnerable 
binary that would cause it to exhibit undesired behavior 
(for example, crash, leak sensitive data, and so on).
The infrastructure team organizing this competi-
tion arguably had an equally daunting task of creating a 
sufficiently realistic, yet distinct and protected arena in 
which these CRSs would compete in the first fully auto-
mated attack–defense capture-the-flag (CTF) event. 
When developing the scoring algorithms that would 
guide development of the first crop of automated cyber 
reasoning systems, we focused on ensuring the follow-
ing properties of scoring:
■ Fairness. Scoring should not discriminate against a 
specific method the team uses to solve the problem. 
Note that artifacts that appear in the solution could 
be penalized (for example, using too much memory 
in a replacement binary), but no specific process of 
bug discovery and remediation should be prescribed 
or proscribed.
■ Collusion resistance. We wanted to entice competi-
tors to focus on improvements in automated net-
work defense, not analysis and defeat of the scoring 
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algorithm. In particular, the scoring algorithm should 
disincentivize collusion between participants.
 ■ Real-world relevance. We wanted the results of this 
research to produce practical prototypes that could be 
readily adopted by the industry, so the scoring algo-
rithm aimed to replicate many of the pressures the real 
world places on security solutions.
 ■ Automated evaluation. Because CGC is a machine-scale 
competition, it would be impossible to score the 
results by hand if only due to the number of submis-
sions. Thus, scoring cannot rely on “expert judgment” 
of any kind; all measures required for scoring have to 
be automated.
Armed with these principles, we considered many 
different options, and settled on two variants of the 
same general algorithm—one used for the CGC Quali-
fying Event (CQE), and one used for the CGC Final 
Event (CFE); the variant algorithms reflect differences 
in the number of participants and mechanics of the 
competition between CQE and CFE.
In the rest of the article, we describe the algo-
rithms themselves, the reasons these formulations were 
selected, how the algorithms affected gameplay in CQE 
and CFE, and general lessons learned that might be 
drawn from our experience to help other CTF competi-
tion designers.
Scoring Rubrics: What to Measure?
The first question that comes to mind when creating the 
scoring algorithm is: What should we measure? Given 
that the CGC competition is about improving the state 
of the art in automated network defense, we certainly 
need some measure of security provided by the replace-
ment binaries produced by competitors’ CRSs. How-
ever, it is exceedingly easy to provide a binary that has 
perfect security—one that does nothing. Therefore, we 
also need to measure the availability of service provided 
by the replacement binary. Finally, because CGC is a 
competition focused on creating cyber reasoning sys-
tems, the scoring algorithm should reward CRSs that 
can find a vulnerability in the original binary—we term 
this rubric evaluation.
Security
The world would be a saner place if an analytic tech-
nique existed that could examine an application and 
provide a complete listing of embedded exploitable vul-
nerabilities; in such a world, we would not need a Cyber 
Grand Challenge, and we would not suffer from so 
many cyberattacks. Instead, we have to consider secu-
rity as a relative, not absolute metric. Attacks provide a 
concrete demonstration of the vulnerability on which 
to base measurement.
In CGC, two different entities provided proofs of 
vulnerability (PoVs), which represented attacks in our 
game environment: challenge binary (CB) authors and 
competitors’ cyber reasoning systems. Challenge binary 
authors were required to provide a PoV that demon-
strated the exploitability of each vulnerability embedded 
in a CGC challenge binary. The CRSs of course would 
also discover and prove vulnerabilities in the challenge 
binaries that formed the substrate of the competition.
Due to the different provenance of PoVs, two differ-
ent security scores were created: a reference security score 
that measured how well a replacement binary defended 
against PoVs provided by CB authors, and a consensus 
security score that measured how well a replacement 
binary defended against PoVs provided by CRSs.
Availability
As mentioned previously, providing a “perfectly secure” 
replacement binary would be trivial, if the replacement 
were not tested for functionality. Clearly, this would violate 
the guideline to encourage solutions that have real-world 
applicability, so we needed a way to measure the function-
ality of the replacement service. To accomplish this task, we 
relied on CB authors to provide a test case generator that 
could automatically create thousands of test cases for the 
application they have developed. Each test case included 
not only the input to the application under test but also the 
logic to decide whether the application’s response was cor-
rect. In effect, the test suite created an automatically check-
able specification of the application behavior. A measure 
of functionality was determined by the number of tests 
passed by the replacement binary compared to the num-
ber of tests passed by the original application.
However, measuring only functionality does not 
fully satisfy the real-world applicability requirement. 
In practice, performance of an application or service is 
also of great importance, and many security solutions 
have not found wide adoption due to their performance 
overhead. To measure performance impact, we con-
centrated on three typical performance factors: CPU 
execution time, memory usage, and file size. The former 
two metrics were computed in aggregate over the execu-
tion of the test cases used as part of the functionality 
test, whereas the latter involved a simple comparison of 
file sizes between original and replacement binaries.
Evaluation
Finally, because we wanted to reward creation of cyber 
reasoning systems, we awarded additional points for 
finding vulnerabilities. The most indisputable way to 
prove that a vulnerability exists is to provide an input or 
interaction with an application that causes the applica-
tion to exhibit some bad behavior (for instance, crashing 
or revealing sensitive information). In CGC, this input 
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took a form of an XML-based description (for CQE) or 
a full binary that interacted with an application over a 
network socket to prove vulnerability (in CFE).
Scoring Algorithm
The scoring algorithm for CQE and CFE shared the 
same structure, though different considerations were pri-
oritized when defining each term. The overall algorithm 
scored each challenge set individually and summed the 
scores over challenge sets (for CQE) and over both 
challenge sets and rounds (for CFE). A challenge set 
score was defined as a product of the scoring rubrics 
described, because we wanted to signal that all parts of 
the competition are equally important and excelling at 
just one aspect would not be sufficient to win:
Score(RB, PoV )  Avail(RB)  Sec(RB)  Eval(PoV ).
The availability term was defined similarly between 
CQE and CFE; however, the security and evaluation 
terms differed slightly. To explain the different formu-
lations for these score components, let’s discuss each 
event separately.
CGC Qualifying Event
CQE was held halfway through the program as a way to 
downselect the cyber reasoning systems that would par-
ticipate in the final, completely automated, attack–defense 
capture-the-flag competition. Because the event occurred 
relatively early in the program, it was not conducted as a 
full-scale attack–defense competition, but instead as an 
approximation of a single round in the final event. During 
this event, the cyber reasoning systems were provided a set 
of 131 previously unseen binaries with embedded vulner-
abilities. Some binaries came with a small capture of net-
work traffic that could be used to deduce their intended 
functionality. The CRS had 24 hours to analyze the bina-
ries, produce replacements that would mitigate embed-
ded vulnerabilities, and provide PoVs (in CQE, this was 
an input that would cause the vulnerable binary to crash 
with a segmentation violation or illegal instruction fault). 
Each entry was then scored according to the above algo-
rithm (summed over all entries to produce the final CQE 
score), where the terms were defined as described below.
Availability. 
Avail(RB)  min(Perf(RB), Func(RB))
( )
_ _ ( )
_ _ _ ( )










mem use overhead RB
cpu exec time overhead RB
file size overhead RB
Func(RB)  (Number of successful tests)/(Number 
of tests)
As discussed previously, availability measures the 
performance and functionality of the replacement binary 
and assigns an availability penalty based on whichever 
degradation is worse. To combine effects of file size, 
memory usage, and CPU execution time overhead, a 
similar approach is taken—the maximum of the three 
performance overheads is selected. In addition, both Perf 
and Func scores are passed through functions that pro-
vide a “faster-than-linear” decrease in score (see Figure 1a 
and Figure 1b, respectively). The idea behind these 
curves was to provide better differentiation between 
higher-performing teams and ensuring that a smooth 
transition is made from maximum availability score 
of 1 to minimum of 0. Note that the Perf graph provides a 
10 percent “grace factor”—that is, if the performance of 
the replacement binary is within 10 percent of the per-
formance of original binary, then no performance pen-
alty is applied. At the other end, a performance overhead 
of 100 percent or more results in 0 availability score.
Security. 
( )


















if SecRe f RB
SecRe f RB SecCon RB
otherwise
In CQE, security was evaluated both against the 
PoVs provided by CB authors (SecRef for reference) and 
CRS-provided PoVs (SecCon for consensus). The for-
mer provided an unbiased measure of whether the CRS 
has mitigated exploitability of a bug inserted by a chal-
lenge binary author; at least one PoV in this category 
had to be mitigated by the replacement binary in order 
for security score to be non-zero. Because other PoVs 
for the same bug might exist, the competitor-provided 
PoVs were also tested against all replacement binaries 
for that challenge set. If a replacement binary mitigated 
all competitor PoVs, its SecCon score was set to 1; oth-
erwise, it was 0.
The reasons for this formulation of the security 
score derive from the requirement that the scoring 
algorithm be collusion resistant. Because CQE was 
conducted online and open to a large number of 
participants, we were concerned that a team might 
register many “sock puppet” teams that would sub-
mit PoVs that the “master” team would know how to 
defend, thus artificially inflating its security score 
while providing no additional security. Therefore, 
we could not give equal weighting to reference PoVs 
and consensus PoVs. A detailed description of the 
red-teaming exercise that led to this decision can be 
found in the CGC FAQ.2
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Evaluation.










The evaluation portion of the score was straightfor-
ward: teams were awarded a 2x multiplier for providing 
a successful PoV against a reference challenge binary, 
thus increasing that team’s score. Note that providing a 
working PoV may also decrease a competitor’s score by 
removing their SecCon bonus.
Discussion. Putting all the terms together, we have the 
following possible score values:
 ■ Balanced CRS. A CRS that solves the challenge com-
pletely with perfect retention of functionality and 
performance (and a successful PoV) would receive a 
score of 1  2  2  4.
 ■ Defense-only CRS. A CRS that uses a defense-only 
strategy with perfect retention of functionality and 
performance would receive a score of 1  2  1  2.
 ■ Offense-only CRS. A CRS that uses an offense-only 
strategy would receive a score of 1  0  2  0.
 ■ Do-nothing CRS. A CRS that just returned the original 
vulnerable binary would receive a score of 1  0  
1  0.
The general idea behind the CQE scoring algorithm 
is that the teams that could automatically mitigate PoVs 
while maintaining functionality and performance of 
an application should receive a high score. If they can 
also provide a PoV against the original binary, their 
score is increased and their competitors’ consensus 
scores might decrease. We wanted to reward finding 
vulnerabilities, but not preclude defense-only solutions. 
Hence, the evaluation factor will not cause the score to 
be 0; however, a purely offense-oriented solution was 
deemed insufficient, so a team could not score points 
by just providing a PoV, without associated nontrivial 
defense in the replacement binary. Thus, we were select-
ing teams with both good defense and good offense to 
advance to the finals.
CGC Final Event
CGC Final Event was a completely autonomous 
attack–defense CTF among the seven finalist CRSs 
determined by total CQE scores. The structure of 
CFE differed significantly from CQE—it consisted of 
96 rounds during which new challenge binaries could 
be introduced into the game or old ones retired. Each 
challenge binary fielded by a CRS was evaluated for 
functionality and performance, with feedback provided 
to the CRS. Each CRS had an opportunity to down-
load replacement binary and network filter submissions 
made by other competitors during the previous round 
and evaluate them to find any new or remaining vul-
nerabilities. Each CRS could also submit a PoV to be 
launched against a specific competitor and receive feed-
back of its success or failure.
There were two different kinds of PoVs in CFE: 
Type 1 (controlled crash) and Type 2 (memory dis-
closure), which modeled different attack types. Type 1 
PoV required that the vulnerable binary would crash 
with specific values of instruction pointer and a 
general-purpose register that were prenegotiated with 
the game infrastructure—this was a proxy for remote 
code execution attack. Type 2 PoV required that an 
interaction with the vulnerable binary result in 
leaking 4 consecutive bytes from the so-called magic 
page that was mapped at a fixed address and contained 
Figure 1. Curves illustrating conversions for (a) performance and (b) functionality.



















































specially crafted pseudorandom data that changed each 
time the binary started—this was a proxy for a secret steal-
ing attack. A more detailed description of CFE PoVs can 
be found in “Proof of Vulnerability Markup Language.”3
The overall structure of the scoring algorithm 
remained the same as in CQE (the scores were now 
summed over both challenge sets and rounds to 
arrive at the final score); however, several of the terms 
required adjustments to capture the new complications 
of rounds, consensus evaluation of security, and intro-
duction of network-based defenses.
Availability.
Perf RB
mem use overhead RB
cpu exec time overhead RB
wall time overhead RB











_ _ ( )
_ _ _ ( )
_ _ ( )
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The performance portion of the availability term was 
slightly adjusted to include a new component of wall-clock 
time in addition to existing CPU execution time. This 
new component reflected the measurement of slow-
down incurred by using a network-based filter to detect or 
respond to attacks; the wall time was measured at the host 
performing the functionality test. In addition, the grace 
factor was lowered from 10 percent to 5 percent to cor-
respond more directly to existing industry requirements 
for readily adoptable security solutions.4
Furthermore, to enable consensus evaluation of 
replacement binaries, CFE infrastructure imposed a 
one-round delay on running the replacement binary 
or associated network filters. This meant that a team 
replacing a binary would get an availability score of 0 
for the service being replaced in that round, while the 
other competitors would get an opportunity to analyze 
the binary for new or remaining vulnerabilities. This 
dynamic was intended to emulate real-world practices 










Sec PoV any competitor PoV successful
otherwise
The security term changed as well. Because we 
expected the replacement binaries to change in 
response to attacks from other competitors, it no lon-
ger made sense to evaluate security using reference PoVs 
provided by CB authors as they were unlikely to work 
against the replacement binaries after the first round. 
Therefore, this score component reflected a more empir-
ical notion of security: if any competitor successfully 
proved vulnerability in the replacement binary, the score 
was set to 1; otherwise, it was set to 2.
Evaluation. 
Eval(PoV)  1  (Number of successful PoVs)/
(Number of competitors – 1)
The evaluation term was modified as well, because 
now a CRS could score against up to six competitors in 
a single round. Note that a CRS could submit a different 
PoV against each competitor to target that competitor’s 
replacement binary.
Discussion. It is more difficult to describe possible 
scoring values in an adversarial environment because 
security and evaluation scores now depend heavily on 
the actions of the competitors. For the sake of exam-
ple, let’s suppose there are only two teams in CFE, 
where Team A plays a specific strategy and Team B 
does nothing. In that case, we have the following pos-
sible score values:
 ■ Balanced CRS. If Team A’s CRS solves the challenge 
completely with perfect retention of functionality and 
performance (and a successful PoV), it would receive 
a score of 1  2  2  4, while Team B would receive 
a score of 1  1  1  1.
 ■ Defense-only CRS. If Team A’s CRS uses a defense-only 
strategy with perfect retention of functionality and 
performance, it would receive a score of 1  2  1 
2, while Team B would receive a score of 1  2  
1 2.
 ■ Offense-only CRS. If Team A’s CRS uses an offense-only 
strategy, it would receive a score of 1  2  2  4, 
while Team B would receive a score of 1  1  1  1.
 ■ Do-nothing CRS. If Team A’s CRS did nothing, it 
would receive a score of 1  2  1  2, while Team B 
would also receive the same score.
The effect of these changes made CFE scores rather 
different from CQE: the security score would no longer 
cause a competitor to receive a 0 for a round; in fact, 
doing nothing (that is, neither replacing a binary nor 
providing PoVs against competitors) guaranteed a score 
of 1 if a service was successfully attacked and a score of 
2 if no attacks against it were successful. Note that the 
dynamics between CRSs become much more impor-
tant in this game—an offense-only strategy works only 
if the competitor is not expected to find the PoV in the 
network traffic and turn it around to attack its creator, 
thus leveling the score.
Competitor Strategies
Given that the intention of the scoring algorithm design 
was to encourage finding and understanding bugs (by 
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generating PoVs) and automatically patching vulner-
abilities without excessive performance or functionality 
degradation, what strategies did they select? Were there 
unintended consequences? In this section, we tackle 
some of these questions and discuss competitors’ strat-
egies in CQE and CFE.
Wall-Time Effects on Competitor Choices
The use of wall time to assess the performance impact 
of a network filter seemed to affect competitor behavior 
in at least two ways. First, most competitors avoided the 
use of network filters entirely; the few filters that were 
deployed were very simple—they terminated sessions 
that contained data resembling references to the magic 
page in attempts to foil Type 2 PoVs. Post-event inter-
views suggested some teams lacked confidence that 
they could estimate the performance impact of fielding 
network filters, and chose to forgo this capability in fear 
of heavy performance penalties. This finding ran coun-
ter to our expectation of teams trying to offload com-
putation into the network appliance, which motivated 
measuring its performance impact in the first place.
The second behavior that was likely prompted by 
the use of wall time in the scoring algorithm was the 
inclusion of infinite loops by one of the teams in their 
PoVs to degrade the performance of their competitors’ 
services. This team would create PoVs that used remote 
code execution to enter a tight infinite loop (equivalent 
of while (1) ;) subsequent to scoring (for exam-
ple, by leaking values of the memory page). This con-
sumes defended host CPU resources and increases the 
response time of other services on the defended host. 
We did not perform analysis to determine if the use 
of this “Type 3 PoV” had a measurable impact on the 
scores of their competitors. But the fact that at least 
two teams managed to significantly degrade the perfor-
mance of their own services by fielding flawed replace-
ment binaries suggests that this strategy has merit.
In CGC, we specifically worked to remove the 
ability of competitors to cause denials of service by 
flooding hosted services with traffic. Each CRS could 
only launch a limited number of PoVs against each 
service on each competitor’s defended host. The 
Type 3 PoV turned out to be a clever hack to bring 
down a competitor’s score in addition to improving 
your own; the one downside to this phenomenon 
was that availability scores for services unrelated to 
the one being exploited could suffer, which made 
the process of identifying the culprit for poor perfor-
mance difficult.
Always Be Throwing
The scoring algorithm imposes no penalties on a team 
for deploying PoVs against their competitors. Teams 
could throw PoVs up to 10 times per round against each 
of their competitors’ services; a few teams elected to 
throw generic PoVs whenever they lacked a working, 
targeted PoV. One team’s generic PoVs simply guessed 
at a magic page value at random (on one occasion the 
guess was correct!). However, this team’s logic for field-
ing generic PoVs may have been flawed, because on at 
least two occasions, their CRS replaced successful tar-
geted PoVs with generic PoVs, which failed to score in 
subsequent rounds.
From a game-theoretic perspective, there was no 
disincentive to throw PoVs, and launching attacks (even 
nonworking ones) provided teams with ability to create 
additional traffic that would have to be filtered by the 
network appliance and analyzed by the target team. In 
addition to using up limited resources, this traffic could 
be used as a cover for real PoV throws, making them 
harder to identify.
Zero Score for Consensus Round
The cost of replacing a service in CFE was intended to 
dissuade teams from relying on frequent replacement 
as a defensive strategy. Post-event interviews with the 
teams suggested that this cost led some teams to post-
pone the submission of replacement binaries and to 
avoid replacing a binary more than once.
At one extreme, Team A generally only replaced a 
binary following indication that the associated service 
was compromised. Their CRS would then not replace 
that same service again, despite feedback indicating the 
replacement had zero availability due to performance or 
functionality degradation. This seemed to be a bug—a 
post-event interview with Team A indicated that they 
removed logic that responded to poor availability at the 
last minute.
Team B employed a different strategy to avoid 
multiple replacements; their CRS replaced all but 
three of the services, seemingly independent of 
whether or not a successful PoV was launched against 
their services. Team B would never replace that ser-
vice again, unless the CRS received feedback that the 
replacement binary had poor availability, in which 
case the CRS would revert to the original binary. In 
some instances, Team B’s CRS incorrectly reverted 
services with perfect availability due to a self-inflicted 
denial-of-service problem caused by heavy CPU 
usage by an unrelated service running on the shared 
defended host.
Team C followed this general strategy as well, 
though they only replaced half of their services, regard-
less of whether the services had been compromised. 
Whenever Team C’s CRS received feedback that a ser-
vice had poor availability, it generally uploaded a new 
replacement binary in response.
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From a game-theoretic perspective, the strategies 
chosen by these teams seem suboptimal. Ideally, a CRS 
should have enough situational awareness to determine 
when a successful PoV against their service has been 
launched and replace the binary with a patched ver-
sion at that point. Preemptive replacement of services 
unnecessarily cost several teams points due to the con-
sensus round downtime, even though no successful 
PoVs were fielded against these services in CFE.
Defenses in CQE versus CFE
During CQE, teams knew that a working PoV would 
be deployed against each of their replacement binaries, 
which motivated the deployment of defenses—in fact, if 
no reference PoVs were mitigated, a team would receive 
a score of 0 on that submission. In CFE, reference PoVs 
were not deployed against the services, and any success-
ful attacks would have to come from competitors. Thus, 
a team’s decision to deploy a defense might depend on 
whether they believed a given service could be compro-
mised by one of their competitors.
In a PoV-rich environment, where many services are 
proven vulnerable, a good strategy (one achieving the 
highest score) might be to focus on patching and patch 
preemptively, as it might prevent a round of reduced 
score when the service is proven vulnerable. However, 
in a PoV-limited environment, where many services 
are not proven vulnerable, a good strategy would be 
to patch only in response to a successful attack, as dis-
cussed earlier. In CFE, only 20 challenge sets out of 82 
were proven vulnerable by competitors, so a strategy of 
patching in response to an attack would have produced 
higher scores. The use of reference PoVs in CFE might 
have provided additional motivation to field defenses 
and enabled better demonstration of CRS patching 
capabilities observed in CQE.
Point Patches versus Generic Patches
While the design of the competition was not intended 
to preclude the use of any given defensive strategy, we 
did strive to encourage correcting the program flaws 
rather than providing generic mitigations that simply 
masked the presence of those flaws. We did not feel that 
liberal application of control flow integrity techniques 
would advance the state of the art of network defense. 
The availability element of the scoring algorithm was 
designed in part to reward targeted patches by penal-
izing increased memory use and CPU execution time.
However, as can been seen in Figure 2, many replace-
ment binaries were fielded that consumed significantly 
fewer resources than the associated reference services. 
Figure 2 shows ratios of resources consumed by replace-
ment binaries divided by resources consumed by refer-
ence binaries, averaged over each round. Each color in 
the figure represents a different team, and the different 
services are arrayed along the x-axis.
The ability of a replacement binary to consume 
fewer resources than the reference service is an unin-
tended effect resulting from the unforgiving perfor-
mance scoring function combined with the fact that 
CGC challenge binaries were simple services and thus 
much smaller than most real-world network services. 
Some utilized a very small number of pages of memory, 
and thus increased memory usage of even a single page 
might drive the availability score to zero. CPU execu-
tion times of very short-running services presented a 
similar problem because any modest increase in pro-
cessing time resulted in large proportional increases in 
the measurement of CPU cycles.
To mitigate this problem of very small challenge 
binaries, the CGC build process deliberately included 
extra data (in the form of an embedded PDF) and 
processing (in the form of a CRC computation across 
the PDF). Neither extra data nor extra computation 
was necessary for correct service functionality; there-
fore, both could be safely removed from each binary. 
During the testing phase before CFE, it was possible 
for teams to learn that space and time cushions could 
be obtained by removing the CRC-related code and 
the PDF data. As a result, teams were able to deploy 
generic defenses without incurring significant avail-
ability costs. This experience indicates that availability 
constraints alone cannot effectively mandate the use 
“point patches” rather than generic defenses on small 
programs.
Effect of Consensus Evaluation
One of the motivations for consensus evaluation was 
to afford teams the opportunity to find bugs inadver-
tently introduced by competitors’ patches. We found 
no evidence of any team successfully exploiting a 
vulnerability unintentionally introduced by another 
team. We did note two instances of intended inser-
tions of vulnerabilities, motivated by the knowledge 
that competitors could analyze patched binaries. The 
first insertion was a honeypot that one team included 
in most of their replacement binaries. This honeypot 
was a simple buffer overflow that was easy to find and 
exploit, but could not be reached when the service was 
executing on CGC Final Event hardware as a result 
of an execution divergence between CGC hardware 
and common analysis environments due to handling 
of cpuid instruction. This honeypot caused several 
opposing teams to field PoVs designed to exploit the 
unreachable flaw, thus providing an effective security 
countermeasure.
The second type of deliberate flaw was a back door 
embedded in a replacement binary, intended to be 
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exploited if another team elected to utilize this binary 
as their own replacement for the backdoored service. 
Post-event interviews indicated that multiple teams 
inserted back doors into their replacement binaries; 
however, no backdoored service was redeployed during 
CFE. This behavior was anticipated by CGC organizers; 
earlier in the project, some teams expressed concerns 
that their replacement binaries might get reused by the 
competitors who would be effectively “free-riding”; 
adding a back door accessible only to the team that cre-
ated the patch dissuades such behavior.
Lessons Learned
Designing and running any capture-the-flag event is a 
nontrivial undertaking; organizing a high-profile com-
pletely automated capture-the-flag event is doubly so. 
Despite best efforts on the part of the game designers, 
some things do not go according to plan, and unin-
tended consequences of scoring or measurement deci-
sions can drive competitors to nonoptimal strategies. In 
this section, we review several lessons learned as part of 
organizing and running the CGC Qualifying and Final 
Events.
Red-Team Scoring Algorithm
When designing the scoring algorithms for CQE and 
CFE, we spent much time considering competitor strat-
egies that would achieve good scores but not advance 
the state of the art in automated network defense. In 
several cases, we had to revise the scoring algorithm to 
provide disincentives for such strategies (for example, 
requiring that at least one reference PoV is mitigated 
in CQE or assigning a significant penalty for service 
replacement). Much of this effort also focused on dis-
couraging collusion between teams. When performing 
such analyses, it is useful to consider teams that might 
“do nothing,” teams that might play defense only, offense 
only, or some sort of balanced or randomized strategy. 
Each team persona might illuminate a different corner 
of the scoring space and provide ideas for improving the 
scoring and redirecting competitors away from undesir-
able strategies.
Make Measurements Reproducible
Any scoring algorithm is closely tied to the measure-
ments that support it; in case of CGC, the measure-
ments included functionality, wall time, CPU execution 
time, memory usage, and whether a PoV thrown against 
a challenge binary successfully proved vulnerability. 
When designing the measurement framework and 
scoring algorithm, we focused on ensuring reproduc-
ibility of scores; that is, running the same round mul-
tiple times with the same inputs should produce the 
same scores for the competing teams. This meant that 
the game infrastructure had to go through great pains 
to control the use of randomness in the game (all ran-
domness available to the challenge binaries and PoVs 
was an output of a pseudorandom number generator 
with a known seed) and limit effects of other nondeter-
minism sources: process scheduling, networking issues, 
and so on. When a particular measurement could not be 
contained to an acceptable level of variance due to these 
sources of nondeterminism, the scoring algorithm had 
Figure 2. Average (a) memory use and (b) execution time factors for CFE 
replacement binaries. Each point represents average memory use or CPU 
execution time factor for replacement binaries by a particular CRS for a 
particular service.
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to be adjusted to contain the effects from such measure-
ments on the resulting score.
Make Metrics Transparent
Much of the scoring algorithm design for CGC was 
driven by the maxim that “you get what you measure.” 
By measuring additional memory usage and additional 
CPU cycles, we hoped to get patches that focused on the 
flaw rather than general program-hardening techniques. 
However, this strategy really only works if the competi-
tors understand what exactly is being measured. Instead 
of providing a clear statement that we would measure 
CPU cycles consumed while the process executed in 
user space, we provided a series of oracles that the teams 
could interact with to divine the effects of techniques 
embedded in their replacement binaries on availability. 
Prior to CQE, this was a sequence of “scored events,” 
and for CFE, this was the “sparring partner.” Part of the 
reasoning for this choice was to prevent the competi-
tors from gaming the scoring mechanism; however, it 
resulted in too much ambiguity and caused some com-
petitors to model the performance metrics incorrectly.
Avoid Wall Time as a Metric
Our choice to use wall time as a metric to measure avail-
ability costs of network filters substantially complicated 
implementation and testing of the CGC game infra-
structure. One problem is that services that complete 
relatively quickly become very sensitive to small varia-
tions in wall time. Thus, differences in kernel schedul-
ing or TCP networking effects could result in significant 
variations between otherwise identical sessions. This 
complicated our ability to achieve repeatable results, 
which are necessary when establishing a baseline against 
which to measure the performance of replacement bina-
ries and network filters.
We investigated an alternative to wall time by mea-
suring aggregate CPU cycles on the network appliance 
component for all polls of a given service. However, 
when first attempted, the network appliance was hosted 
on Linux, and the CPU cycle measurements had very 
high variations. We were finally able to achieve repeat-
able wall-time measurements after converting all of the 
infrastructure components to FreeBSD and carefully 
tuning the kernel configurations.
I n this article, we presented our experience and lessons learned in designing and implementing the scoring 
algorithms for the CGC Qualifying and Final Events. 
These algorithms succeeded in incentivizing competi-
tors to develop systems that could automatically patch 
previously unseen binaries to mitigate vulnerabilities 
as well as provide proofs of vulnerabilities for these 
binaries. The scoring algorithms in CGC were designed 
for automated evaluation and strived to achieve fairness, 
collusion resistance, and real-world relevance, and in 
many aspects we believe that they succeeded. We hope 
that knowledge of our experience proves useful to other 
capture-the-flag competition designers and helps them 
avoid some of the pitfalls we faced. 
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